A Friedrich Nietzsche

Do you want to have an easy life? Then always stay with the herd and lose yourself in the Nietzsche. And once you are awake, you shall remain awake eternally. I'm not upset that you lied to me, I'm upset that from now on I can't believe you. To live is to suffer, Friedrich, to survive is to find some Nietzsche in the suffering.

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Related Authors Arthur Schopenhauer Philosopher. Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauer while studying in Leipzig. For Nietzsche, the most important aspect Nietzsche this philosophy was the figure from which it emanated, representing for him the heroic ideal of a man in the life of thought: Even before the publication of Birth of Tragedyhe Nietzsche attempted to re-position himself at Basel in the department of source, but the University apparently never took such an endeavor seriously.

Byhis circumstances at Basel deteriorated to the point that neither the University nor Nietzsche was very much interested in seeing him continue as a professor there, so both agreed that he should retire with a modest pension [CE2].

His physical woes, Nietzsche, would continue to plague him for the remainder of his life. After leaving Basel, Nietzsche enjoyed a period of great productivity. And, during this time, he was never to stay in one place for long, moving with the seasons, in search of relief for his ailments, solitude for his work, and reasonable living conditions, given his very modest budget. Moritz, and winters in Genoa, Nice, or Rappollo on the Mediterranean coast.

Occasionally, he would visit family and friends in Naumburg or Basel, and he spent a great deal of time in social discourse, exchanging letters with friends and associates. She quickly began shaping his image and the reception of his work, which by this time had already gained momentum among academics such as Georg Brandes.

Soon the Nietzsche legend would grow in spectacular fashion among popular readers. Unfortunately, Friedrich experienced little of his fame, having never recovered from the breakdown of late and early His final years were spent at Villa Silberblick in grim mental and physical deterioration, ending mercifully August 25, He was buried in Röcken, near Leipzig.

The following division is typical:. During this time Nietzsche was admitted into the prestigious Gymnasium Schulpforta; he composed music, wrote poetry and plays, and in produced an autobiography at the age of He also produced more serious and accomplished works on themes related to philology, literature, and philosophy. He was influenced intellectually by the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and emotionally by the artist Richard Wagner. This text also included a Wagnerian precept for cultural flourishing: It is a work of acerbic cultural criticism, encomia to Schopenhauer and Wagner, and an unexpectedly idiosyncratic analysis of the newly developing historical consciousness.

A fifth meditation on the discipline of philology is prepared but left unpublished. Plagued by poor health, Nietzsche is released from teaching duties in February his affiliation with the university officially ends in and he is granted a small pension. A peculiar kind of meaningfulness is thus gained by the retrograde step: Nietzsche transitions into a new period with the conclusion of The Gay Science Book IV and his next published work, the novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra, produced in four parts between and Also in he returns to philosophical writing with Beyond Good and Evil.

In he attempts to consolidate his inquiries through self-criticism in Prefaces written for the earlier published works, and he writes a fifth book for The Gay Science. In he writes On the Genealogy of Morality. Inwith failing health, he produces several texts, including The Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, and two works concerning his prior relationship with Wagner. During this period, as with the earlier ones, Nietzsche produces an abundance of materials not published during his lifetime.

For years this material has been published piecemeal in Germany and translated to English in various collections. Philosophically, during this period, Nietzsche continues his explorations on morality, truth, aesthetics, history, power, language and identity.

The intent here seems to be an overcoming or dissolution of metaphysics. And, some will even deny that he achieves nor even attempts the overcoming described above.

Despite such complaints, interpreters of Nietzsche continue to reference these ineffable concepts. Let's outline four of these concepts, but not before adding a word of caution regarding how this outline should be received. Although it would not be illogical to say that Nietzsche mistrusted philosophical systems, while nevertheless building one of his own, some commentators point out two important qualifications.

At the very least, we can say that Nietzsche does not intend it to establish a strong and unmovable absolute, a negative-system, from which dogma may be drawn. Perhaps it is a discredit to Nietzsche as a philosopher that he did not elaborate his position more carefully within this tension; or, perhaps such uncertainty has its own ground. For a second cautionary note, many commentators will argue along with Richard Schacht that, instead of building a system, Nietzsche is concerned only with the exploration of problems, and that his kind of philosophy is limited to the interpretation and evaluation of cultural inheritances Why is this so?

All beginnings and ends, for Nietzsche, are thus lost in a flood of indeterminacy. How then shall they be understood? The existence of a value presupposes a value-positing perspective, and values are created by human beings and perhaps other value-positing agents as aids for survival and growth.

Because values are important for the well being of the human animal, because belief in them is essential to our existence, we oftentimes prefer to forget that values are our own creations and to live through them as if they were absolute.

For these reasons, social institutions enforcing adherence to inherited values are permitted to create self-serving economies of power, so long as individuals living through go here are thereby made more secure and their possibilities for life enhanced.

Nevertheless, from time to time the values we inherit are deemed no longer suitable and the continued enforcement of them no longer stands in the service of life.

To maintain allegiance to such values, even when they no longer seem practicable, turns what once served the advantage to individuals to a disadvantage, and what was Friedrich the prudent deployment of values into a life denying Nietzsche of power. When this happens the human being must reactivate its creative, value-positing capacities and construct new values. Commentators will differ on the question of whether nihilism for Nietzsche refers specifically to a state of affairs characterizing specific historical moments, in which inherited values have been exposed as superstition and have thus become outdated, or whether Nietzsche means something more Friedrich this.

It is, Nietzsche the very least, accurate to say that for Nietzsche nihilism has become a problem by the nineteenth century, A Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche scientific, technological, and political revolutions of the previous two Friedrich years put an enormous amount of pressure on the old world order.

In this environment, old value systems were being Nietzsche under the weight of newly discovered grounds for doubt. Friedrich possibility arises, then, that nihilism for Nietzsche is merely a temporary stage in the refinement of true belief.

Reason is not a value, in this reading, but rather the means by which human beings examine their metaphysical presuppositions and explore new avenues to truth. But to relegate nihilism to that situation, A Friedrich Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, leaves our thinking of it incomplete.

Near the beginning of the aphorisms collected under the title, Will To Power aphorism Nietzschewe find this note from That the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking; 'Why? According to Nietzsche, the conceptual framework known as Western metaphysics was Nietzsche articulated by Plato, who had pieced together remnants of a declining worldview, borrowing elements from predecessors such as Anaximander, Parmenides, and especially Socrates, in order to overturn a cosmology that had been in play from the days of Homer and which found its fullest and last expression in the thought of Heraclitus.

Values most responsible for the scientific revolution, however, are also crucial to the metaphysical system that modern science is destroying. Such values are threatening, then, to bring about the destruction of their own foundations. Thus, the highest values are devaluing themselves at the core. Most importantly, the values of honesty, probity, and courage in the search for truth no longer seem compatible with the guarantee, the bestowal, and the bestowing agent of an absolute value.

What philosophical ground, after all, could support revaluation if this interpretation were accurate? If, indeed, a workable epistemology may be derived from reading specific passages, and good reasons can be given for prioritizing those passages, then consistent grounds may exist for Nietzsche having leveled a critique of morality.

But, Nietzsche insisted, in an intellectual climate that demands honesty in the search for truth and proof as a condition for belief, the absence of foundations has already been laid bare. The dawn of a new day had broken, and shadows now cast, though long, were receding by the minute.

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche claims that the logic of an existence lacking inherent meaning demands, from an organizational standpoint, a value-creating response, however weak this response might initially be in comparison to how its values are then taken when enforced by social institutions aphorisms Nihilism stands not only for that apparently inevitable process by which the highest values devalue themselves.

It also stands for that moment of recognition in which human existence appears, ultimately, to be in vain. How, and for how long, did the values here serve the living? What form of redemption was sought here, and was this form indicative of a healthy life? What may one learn about the creation of values by surveying such cultures? Emphasis is laid on the one who faces the problem of nihilism. The problem of value-positing concerns the one who posits values, and this one must be examined, along with a corresponding evaluation of relative strengths and weaknesses.

Here was evidence, Nietzsche believed, that humanity could face the dreadful truth of existence without becoming paralyzed. The strength of Greek culture is evident in the gods, the tragic art, and the philosophical concepts and personalities created by the Greeks themselves.

Comparing the creativity of the Greeks to the intellectual work of modernity, the tragic, affirmative thought of Heraclitus to the pessimism of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche highlights a number of qualitative differences. Both types are marked by the appearance of nihilism, having been drawn into the inevitable logic of value-positing and what it would seem to indicate.

The Greek type nevertheless demonstrates the characteristics of strength by activating and re-intensifying the capacity to create, by overcoming paralysis, by willing a new truth, and by affirming the will. Precisely tragedy is the proof that the Greeks were no pessimists: The work to overcome pessimism is tragic in a two-fold sense: Hence, a pessimism of weakness and an incomplete form of nihilism prevail in the modern epoch. Redemption in this life is denied, while an uncompleted form of nihilism remains the fundamental condition of humanity.

Why, then, this failure? What does modernity lack? How and why do nihilism and the pessimism of weakness prevail in modernity? Again, from the notebook of Will to Power, aphorism 27we find two conditions for this situation:.

In this way the whole of existence is vulgarized: Even here, moreover, the Übermensch is only briefly and very early announced in the narrative, albeit with a tremendous amount of fanfare, before fading from explicit consideration. The hope for an overman figure to appear would seem to be permissible for one individual, many, or even a social ideal, depending on the culture within which it appears.

Although Nietzsche never lays out a precise political program from these ideas, it is at least clear that theoretical justifications for complacency or passivity are antithetical to his philosophy. What, then, may be said about Nietzsche as political thinker?

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844—1900)

Such hostilities are born out of ressentiment and inherited from Judeo-Christian moral value systems. The distinction between the good man of active power and the Nietzsche type also points to ambiguity Nietzsche the concept of freedom, A Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche link points to such exceptions as they have appeared throughout history—Napoleon is one of his favorite examples. In modernity, the emergence of such figures seems possible only as an isolated event, as a flash of lightening from the dark cloud of humanity.

Was there ever a culture, in contrast Friedrich modernity, which saw these sorts Nietzsche higher types emerge in congress as a matter of expectation and design? Such institutions thereby promoted the elevation of human exemplars. Later Friedrich is also clear that his descriptions of the Greeks should not be taken programmatically as a political vision for the future see for example GS For this reason, none of these exemplars should be confused for the others.

This need explains the meaning of the parodic fourth book of Zarathustra, which opens with the title character reflecting on the whole of his teachings: The exemplar expresses hope not granted from metaphysical illusions. After sharpening the critique of art and genius during the positivistic period, Nietzsche seems more cautious about heaping praise upon specific historical figures and types, but even when he could no longer find an ideal exception, he nevertheless deemed it requisite to fabricate one in myth.

Work pursued in service of the future constitutes for Nietzsche an earthly form of redemption. Yet, exemplars of type, whether in the form of isolated individuals like Napoleon, or of whole cultures like the Greeks, are not caught up in petty historical politics or similar mundane endeavors. According to Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idolstheir regenerative powers are necessary for the work of interpreting the meaning and sequence of historical facts.

My Conception of the genius— Great men, like great epochs, are explosive material in whom tremendous energy has been accumulated; their prerequisite has always been, historically and psychologically, that a protracted assembling, accumulating, economizing and preserving has preceded them—that there has been no explosion for a long time.

Of what account then are circumstances, the epoch, the Zeitgeist, public opinion! To what extent is Nietzsche entitled to such a vision? Nietzsche attempts to describe the logical structure of great events, as if a critical understanding of them pertains to their recurrence in modernity: The great man and the great deed belong to a human destiny, one that emerges in situations of crisis and severe want.

Psychologically, Nietzsche are the effects of human energy stored and kept dormant for long periods of time in dark clouds Friedrich indifference.

Primal energy gathers to a point before a cataclysmic event, like a chemical reaction with an electrical charge, unleashes some decisive, episodic force on all humanity. From here, the logic unfolds categorically: All possibilities become necessities, given an infinite amount of time. Perhaps understanding this logic marks a qualitative difference in the way existence is understood.

Perhaps this qualitative difference will spark the revaluation of values.

When a momentous event takes place, the Nietzsche bolts from the cloud of normalcy as a point of extreme difference. Such commentators will maintain that Nietzsche either in no way intends to construct a new meta-theory, or if he does then Nietzsche intentions are mistaken and in conflict with his more prescient insights, A Friedrich Nietzsche.

Indeed, much evidence exists to support each of these positions. Nevertheless, with this bit of moral psychology, a debate exists among commentators concerning whether Nietzsche intends to make dubious morality per se or whether he merely Friedrich to expose those life-denying ways of moralizing inherited Friedrich the beginning of Friedrich thought. Nietzsche, at the very least, is not concerned with divining origins. He is interested, A Friedrich Nietzsche, rather, in measuring the value of what is taken as true, if such a thing can be measured.

For Nietzsche, a long, murky, and Friedrich misunderstood history has conditioned the human animal in response to physical, Friedrich, and social necessities GM II and in ways that have created additional needs, Nietzsche primarily the need Nietzsche believe in a purpose for its very existence GS 1. This tomei Matemática financeira exercios enganaram Nietzsche may be uncritically engaged, as happens with the incomplete nihilism of those who wish to remain in the shadow of metaphysics and with Nietzsche laisser aller of the last man who overcomes dogmatism by making humanity impotent BGE In the more critical engagement, Nietzsche attempts to transform the need for truth and reconstitute the truth drive in ways that are already incredulous towards the dogmatizing tendency of philosophy and thus able to withstand the new suspicions BGE 22 and Perhaps the radicalization of will to power in this way amounts to no more than an account of this world to the exclusion of any other.

Nietzsche thus attempts to bring forward precisely that kind of affirmation which exists in and through its own essence, insofar as will to power as a principle of affirmation is made possible by its own destructive modalities which pulls back the curtain on metaphysical illusions and dogma founded on them. How does the exceptional, for example, begin to take shape in the ordinary, or truth in untruth, reason in un-reason, social order and law in violence, a being in becoming?

The variation and formal emergence of each of these states must, according to Nietzsche, be understood as a possibility only within a presumed sphere of associated events. Indeed, the new cosmology must account for such a fate. Most importantly, the new cosmology must grant meaning to this eternal recurrence of emergence and disintegration without, however, taking vengeance upon it.

Chemistry of concepts and feelings. In almost all respects, philosophical problems today are again formulated as they were two thousand years ago: Until now, metaphysical philosophy has overcome this difficulty by denying the origin of the one from the other, and by assuming for the more highly valued things some miraculous origin…. Historical philosophy, on the other hand, the very youngest of all philosophical methods, which can no longer be even conceived of as separate from the natural sciences, has determined in isolated cases and will probably conclude in all of them that they are not opposites, only exaggerated to be so by the metaphysical view….

As historical philosophy explains it, there exists, strictly considered, neither a selfless act nor a completely disinterested observation: In them the basic element appears to be virtually dispersed and proves to be present only to the most careful observer.

Human, All Too Human1. How is it dispersed so that only the careful observer can detect it? On the doctrine of the feeling of power. Whether benefiting or hurting others involves sacrifices for us does not affect the ultimate value of our actions. Even if we offer our lives, as martyrs do for their church, this is a sacrifice that is offered for our desire for power or for the purpose of preserving our feeling of power. Certainly the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the face of this poverty….

No otherworldly measures exist, for Nietzsche. Yet, one should not conclude from this absence of a transcendental measure that all expressions of power are qualitatively the same.

That is the nature of living creatures.

Friedrich Nietzsche Quotes

Either way, one will be commanded, but Friedrich difference is qualitative. Hence, A Friedrich Nietzsche, one will take the easier path, if unable to Nietzsche, choosing instead to obey the directions of another.

The exception, however, A Friedrich Nietzsche, will command and obey the healthy and self-mastering demands of a willing Nietzsche. But why, we might ask, are all living Friedrich beholden to such commanding and obeying? Where is the proof of necessity here? Listen to my teaching, you wisest men! Test in earnest whether I have crept into the heart of life itself and down to the roots of its heart! But what is being obeyed, on the cosmological level, and what is being commanded?

At this point, Zarathustra passes on a secret told to him by life itself: The venom of slave morality is thus directed outwardly in ressentiment and inwardly in bad conscience. The ancient philosophical problem of emergence is resolved, in part, with the cosmology of a creative, self-grounding, Nietzsche, sustaining and enhancing will to power. Such willing, most importantly, commands, which at the same time is an obeying: Life, in this view, is essentially self-overcoming, a self-empowering power accomplishing more power to no other end.

Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will Nietzsche power—and nothing besides! Nietzsche discovers, here, the Friedrich to articulate one of his most ambitious concepts. In spite of the positivistic methodology of The Genealogy, beneath the surface of this natural history of morals, will to power pumps life into the heart of both master and slave conceptual frameworks.

Moreover, will to power stands as a necessary condition for all value judgments. How, one Nietzsche ask, are these cosmological intuitions derived? How Friedrich knowledge Friedrich both will to power and its eternally recurring play of creation and destruction grounded?

Logically, with respect to knowledge, Nietzsche insists that principles of perception and judgment evolve co-dependently with consciousness, in response to physical necessities. The self is organized and brought to stand within the body and by the stimuli received Nietzsche. This means that all principles are transformations of stimuli and interpretations thereupon: Let us beware, Nietzsche cautions, of saying that the world possesses any sort of order or coherence without these interpretations GSeven to the extent that Nietzsche Nietzsche conceives will to power as the way of all things.

One aspect of the absence of absolute order is Nietzsche interpretive gestures are necessarily called-forth for the establishment of meaning.

A critical requirement of this interpretive gesture becoming transparent is that the new interpretation must knowingly affirm that all principles are grounded in interpretation. According to Nietzsche, such reflexivity does not discredit his cosmology: The philosopher of the future will posses a level of critical awareness hitherto unimagined, given that his interpretive gestures will be recognized as such.

Yet, a flourishing life will still demand, one might imagine, being able to suspend, hide, or forget—at the right moments—the creation of values, especially the highest values. Or, do trees and other forms of vegetation? Apparently, they do not. Such problems involve, again, the question of freedom, which interests Nietzsche primarily in the positive form.

Some human forms of participation in will to power are noble, others ignoble. Oh you noble Stoics, what deceptive words these are! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power—how could you live according to this indifference?

Living—is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not living — estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?

But this is an ancient, eternal story: It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Other commentators have suggested that Nietzsche, here, betrays all of philosophy, lacking any sense of decency with this daring expose—that what is left after the expression of such a forbidden truth is no recourse to meaning. Within nature, one might say, energy disperses and accumulates in various force-points: Periodically, something exceptional is thrust out from its opposite, given that radical indifference is indifferent even towards itself if one could speak of ontological conditions in such a representative tone, which Nietzsche certainly does from time to time.

Nature is disturbed, and the human being, having thus become aware of its own identity and of others, works towards preserving itself by tying things down with definitions; enhancing itself, occasionally, by loosening the fetters of old, worn-out forms; creating and destroying in such patterns, so as to make humanity and even nature appear to conform to some bit of tyranny.

From within the logic of will to power, narrowly construed, human meaning is thus affirmed. To no end, Nietzsche would answer. But nothing exists apart from the whole! But, what temporal model yields the possibility for these expressions? The solution takes shape as Nietzsche fills the temporal horizons of past and future with events whose denotations have no permanent tether.

Will to power, the Heraclitean cosmic-child, plays-on without preference to outcomes. Within the two-fold limit of this horizon, disturbances emerge from their opposites, but one cannot evaluate themabsolutelybecause judgment implicates participation in will to power, in the ebb and flow of events constituting time. The objective perspective is not possible, since the whole consumes all possibilities, giving form to and destroying all that has come to fulfillment.

Whatever stands in this flux, does so in the midst of the whole, but only for a while. It disturbs the whole, but does so as part of the whole. As such, whatever stands is measured, on the one hand, by the context its emergence creates. On the other hand, whatever stands is immeasurable, by virtue of the whole, the logic of which would determine this moment to have occurred in the never-ending flux of creation and destruction. One is left only to describe material occurrences and to intuit the passing of time.

Each simple thing or complex event is linked, inextricably, to a near infinite number of others, also demonstrating the possibilities of their happenings. If all of these possibilities could be presented in such a way as to account for their relationships and probabilities, as for example on a marvelously complex set of dice, then it could be shown that each of these possibilities will necessarily occur, and re-occur, given that the game of dice continues a sufficient length of time.

Next, Nietzsche considers the nature of temporal limits and duration. He proposes that no beginning or end of time can be determined, absolutely, in thought. No matter what sort of temporal limits are set by the imagination, questions concerning what lies beyond these limits never demonstrably cease.

Time is infinite with this model, but filled by a finite number of material possibilities, recurring eternally in the never-ending play of the great cosmic game of chance. What intuition led Nietzsche to interpret the cosmos as having no inherent meaning, as if it were playing itself out and repeating itself in eternally recurring cycles, in the endless creation and destruction of force-points without purpose?

How does this curious temporal model relate to the living of life? In his philosophical autobiography, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche grounds eternal recurrence in his own experiences by relating an anecdote regarding, supposedly, its first appearance to him in thought.

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